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DIVINE TEMPORALITY AND 
CREATION EX NIHILO 
Thomas D. Senor 
In his paper "Hartshorne and Aquinas: A Via Media," William P. Alston 
argues that one who rejects the doctrine of divine timelessness should also 
reject the doctrine of creation ex nihilo and hold that the world and God are 
'equally basic metaphysically.' At the heart of Alston's argument is the claim 
that a temporally everlasting deity would be irrational in creating at any given 
moment since there could never be a sufficient reason for creating then. In 
"Divine Temporality and Creation Ex Nihilo," I argue that Alston's argument 
is not compelling, and that the defender of divine temporality can plausibly 
maintain that God can rationally create at a time even if He lacks a sufficient 
reason for acting at that moment. 
Introduction 
In an essay in his recently published book of papers, Divine Nature and 
Human Language (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), William P. 
Alston argues that the theist who rejects divine timelessness cannot reason-
ably hold the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Alston writes: 
If God is temporal we have to think of Him as infinitely extended in time. If 
He began to exist some finite period of time ago, that would call for some 
explanation outside Himself; He would not be a fundamentally underived being. 
His ceasing to exist is impossible for the same reason. And if the fact that there 
is a physical universe is due to an act of divine will, that act, if God is temporal, 
would have to take place at some time. But then at whatever time it takes 
place God would have already exited for an infinite period of time; and we 
would be faced with the Augustinian question of why God chose to create 
the universe at that time rather than at some other. Thus if we think of God as 
temporal the most reasonable picture is the Hartshornean one of God and the 
world confronting each other throughout time as equally basic metaphysically, 
with God's creative activity confined to bringing it about, so far as possible, 
that the world is in accordance with His aims. And conversely, if we are to defend 
the classical doctrine of creation we must think of God as nontemporal (from 
"Hartshorne and Aquinas: A Via Media", in Alston op. cit., pages 132-133). 
So on Alston's view the doctrines of divine timelessness and creation ex nihilo 
stand or fall together. In this paper, I shall show that. Professor Alston is 
mistaken in this regard. 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 
Vol. 10 No.1 January 1993 
All rights reserved. 
86 
DIVINE TEMPORALITY AND CREATION 87 
Section I: A Closer Look at the Argument 
Since the argument goes so very quickly in Alston's article, we will need to 
get clear on just what it is and why he thinks that the timelessness advocate 
(hereafter the 'atemporalist') doesn't have the same problem. 
The question that raises the difficulty for one who rejects timelessness 
(hereafter the 'temporalist') is this: Why did God create the world when He 
did? According to standard temporalism, there was a time at which God alone 
existed, after which God created the universe. But what could make God 
choose one time rather than another as the moment to begin to create? For 
as long as the universe isn't infinitely old (i.e., as long as it has a beginning 
in time), there was an infinite amount of time during which God alone existed. 
Now the traditional theist will claim that God doesn't change His mind; so 
it can't be that at some time tl, God intends to never create and then at a 
later time t2, God begins to intend to create. So if God intends to create, He 
always does; and given that the difference between one moment and another 
is simply that they are at different places on the time-line, it looks as though 
God could have no reason to create at t2 as opposed to any other time. So 
since (i) God is a perfectly rational being, (ii) there is a sufficient reason for 
any action of a perfectly rational being, and (iii) there can be no sufficient 
reason for creating at any given moment over another, it follows that there 
is no time at which God begins to create the universe. 
So, concludes Alston, the temporalist shall have to choose: either the exis-
tence of the world is metaphysically fundamental or else God lacks perfect 
rationality. But of course no theist of any stripe will choose the second 
disjunct; hence she must conclude that the existence of the world is indepen-
dent of God's creative activity. 
How does the atemporalist avoid this problem? With great ease. In order 
for the argument to get off the ground, one must suppose that there was a 
time at which God and God alone exists. But the atemporalist will not accept 
this premise. Before creation, there wasn't any time at all, since time is of 
the created order. So God didn't have to choose a moment to create since 
before creation there wasn't any time. 
I should now like to add a complication. A few paragraphs back I made 
reference to 'standard temporalism.' This view sees time as essentially infi-
nite in both directions, and God as existing at all times. So standard temporal-
ism is the dual thesis that (i) God has the property of existing at all times and 
(ii) His existence is always at a time. And standard temporalism suggests, 
although it does not entail, that God's temporality is independent of His 
creative activity. So before creation, God and God alone existed through time. 
It is standard temporalism that Alston needs to get his argument going. 
However, it isn't the only temporalist possibility. Here is another variety of 
temporalism (call it 'accidental temporalism') that completely avoids the 
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difficulty Alston discusses.' Suppose that time is a part of the created order. 
In that case, time is not infinite in both directions and need not be infinite 
even in one. What makes this position a type of temporalism is that it insists 
that for any time, God exists at that time. Thus, it accepts the first conjunct 
of standard temporalism, but rejects the second; God exists timelessly if there 
is no creation. This perspective would seem to have three quite attractive 
features. First, in claiming that time is an aspect of the created order, it 
comports well with contemporary physical theory. Second, it makes the ex-
istence of time clearly dependent on the will of God. Standard temporalism 
encourages us to view time as something that God is 'passing through' even 
in worlds at which He never creates. Thus, the doctrine of divine aseity is 
better preserved with this alternative. Finally, and more importantly for our 
purposes, accidental temporalism allows one to make the Augustinian reply 
to Alston's problem; for she can say that the question "What was God doing 
before He created?" is unintelligible since there was no time before creation. 
So the temporalist needn't either be committed to the temporal eternality of 
creation or have an answer to the questions "Why would God waitT' and 
"Why would God choose to create just when He did?" 
Are there problems with accidental temporalism? If not, given its clear 
advantages, perhaps the temporally-inclined theist would be better off adopt-
ing it over the standard view. Unfortunately, accidental temporalism does 
bring with it some apparent difficulties. First, it is committed to the intelli-
gibility of atemporal agency or personhood. 2 Surely we must think of God as 
somehow active even in worlds in which He doesn't create; perhaps the 
doctrine of the Trinity can be useful in explaining how this is possible. At a 
very minimum, the accidental temporalist must allow for the possibility of 
an atemporal person. But a primary motivation for adopting temporalism in 
the first place is the suspicion that there can't be atemporal persons. So one 
advantage of standard temporalism is not also had by its accidental cousin. 
A second problem for accidental temporalism concerns the parallels between 
space and time. Surely the motivations that lead one to accidental temporal-
ism had better not equally support 'accidental spatialism.' That is, the acci-
dental temporalist wants to say that both space and time are products of divine 
creative activity; now, if creating time brings it about that God is temporal, 
shouldn't creating space bring it about that God is spatial? But that is not 
something to which the traditional theist wants to be committed. 
The accidental temporalist might attempt to dodge this charge by claiming 
that creating time (and space) is only necessary and not sufficient for God's 
being temporal (and spatial).3 If there is time, then God can choose whether 
or not to be temporal. And the same goes with space. The accidental tem-
poralist could then maintain that God has chosen temporality but not spati-
ality. But what would be the explanation of this? Is it because God is not able 
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to bring about temporal events without thereby being temporal? That isn't an 
explanation that the accidental temporalist can offer because she is committed 
to saying that an atemporal being brings about the first temporal event. And 
why would God choose to join creation in temporality? Perhaps the accidental 
temporalist can avoid these questions altogether by showing that there is an 
important disanalogy between space and time. 
n is not my purpose to offer a complete evaluation of accidental temporal-
ism. I believe that this limited discussion does permit us to draw two some-
what tentative conclusions: first, accidental temporalism is prima facie 
coherent, and second, it is neither clearly superior to nor inferior to standard 
temporalism. As I pointed out above, the accidental temporalist has available 
to her precisely the same response to Alston's argument that the atemporalist 
has. So Alston will have to be understood as arguing against what I have 
called 'standard temporalism. '4 Hereafter, it is this position that I intend to 
designate by the simple term 'temporalism.' 
Now it is sometimes claimed that a temporal God could create from eter-
nity, in which case the universe is infinitely old, and there is no time at which 
God begins to create the universe. Alston blocks this move, however, with 
the argument that creation requires an act of will and any act of will of a 
temporal being must take place at some time; hence at any time that God 
wills to create, there will have already been an infinite amount of time. So 
if God is temporal, the universe must not be infinitely old. 
This does not strike me as a good argument. From the fact that, for a 
temporal divine being, every act of will must take place at some time, it 
doesn't follow that for every act of that being's will there is a time at which 
that act began. And this entailment is precisely what is required for Alston's 
argument to go through. And furthermore it is hard to see why the temporalist 
should agree that all of God's acts of will must have a temporal beginning. 
That is, what prevents the temporalist from claiming that a temporal God 
could have willed from eternity that a universe exist now, with 'now' picking 
out the present moment? If God has this will eternally, then the universe is 
infinitely old. 
In fact, it is sometimes thought that the problem that Alston raises about 
God not having sufficient reason to create at any particular moment suggests 
not that God and the world are 'equally basic metaphysically' but rather that 
God has created the world from eternity.5 And surely if the theist is presented 
with a choice between the world's being created from eternity and its being 
'equally basic metaphysically' with God, the theist will reasonably choose 
the former. Nevertheless, the traditional understanding of the doctrine of 
creation is that the created world is finite, i.e., it had a beginning in time. 
Why would God have waited to create? God only knows. Perhaps it would 
somehow be inappropriate if creation were eternal; perhaps that would foster 
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the false view that the world is metaphysically independent of God. And God 
might naturally be supposed to not want to give this impression. However 
this might be, in what follows, I will assume that it isn't unreasonable for the 
theist to suppose that there is some sufficient reason for God's waiting to 
create; that is, let's suppose with Alston that the theist must choose between 
these theses: (a) there is a time at which God begins to create the world ex 
nihilo; and (b) the world and God are equally basic metaphysically. 
Section II: The Solution 
Of course, other things being equal, the theist will gladly opt for (a). How-
ever, according to the argument above, one can't choose (a) without claiming 
that God is not perfectly rational. For God could have no good reason for 
creating at t1 rather than at t2; and since a perfectly rational agent would not 
act without a sufficient reason, if (a) is true, then God is not perfectly rational. 
I believe, contra Alston, that the temporalist can very reasonably accept 
creation ex nihilo. The reason for this is that the argument from (a) to the 
irrationality of God is defective. For the argument depends on the following 
principle of rationality (which I glossed in the preceding section): 
PI: A perfectly rational agent will do action A only if she has sufficient 
reason to do A. 
I understand sufficiency of reason here in such a way that S's having a 
sufficient reason for doing A entails that S is rationally obligated to do A. 
The problem for the temporalist is then formed by combining (PI) with the 
claim that there can't be a sufficient reason to create at any particular time, 
and concluding that God can't be perfectly rational and create the universe 
at any particular moment. 
Now it is clear that there are plenty of cases in which (P I) is violated. 
Consider a Buridan's Ass-type case. Robinson is on a deserted island, and 
desperately in need of water. He finds a map that tells him that there are two 
wells of fresh water on the island, each being exactly 12 miles from where 
he is now; one of the wells is directly east and the other is due west. Now he 
knows that he can't possibly go to both at the same time, and the terrain 
looks to be equally rugged in both directions. He knows of no good reason 
to prefer going to one well over the other. Now if he suddenly chooses to 
go to the well to the east, for no particular reason, we think that he has not 
made an irrational choice. The irrational thing to do would be to die from 
indecision. 
However, (PI) does not agree with our assessment. Since he doesh't have 
a rationally obligating reason to prefer the one well over the other, Robinson 
is deemed 'irrational.' So much the worse for (Pl). Surely the following rule 
of rationality is on more solid footing: 
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(P2): If S has an all-things-considered desire D, and S rationally believes 
that action A will be at least as likely to lead to the satisfaction of D 
as any other action that she has available, then S's doing A is rationally 
permissible. 
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(An 'all-things-considered desire' is a desire that is stronger than all of its 
competitors.) (P2) endorses our judgment of Robinson's decision. Now let's 
consider the situation God would be in if He had delayed creation, but had 
a desire to create the universe. God would know that there would be no reason 
to prefer any particular time over any other, and that His action of beginning 
to create would have to take place at some particular moment. So He has no 
reason to prefer any moment over any other; but He also knows that whenever 
He creates He wi\1 guarantee the satisfaction of His desire to create a uni-
verse. So for any moment that God creates the universe, God will have acted 
in accordance with (P2). 
Finally, there is another rule of rationality that seems relevant here and that 
God also satisfies in the above scenario. When considering the Robinson case, 
I said that he would behave irrationally if he were to die of thirst because he 
couldn't decide on either of two equally attractive weBs. It seems that I was 
appealing to a principle such as: 
(P3): If S has an all-things-considered desire D, and actions A, B, and C 
available to her that are all equally and highly likely to lead to the 
satisfaction of D, and there is no other action available to S that is at 
least as likely to lead to the satisfaction of D as A, B, and C are, then 
S is rationally obligated to perform A or B or C. 
This tells us that in the above scenario, it would not only be rationally 
acceptable for God to create at an arbitrary time, but that He couldn't be 
perfectly rational unless he did (since no person who violates rational duties 
is perfectly rational). 
Therefore, the fact that God has no reason to prefer to create at one moment 
as opposed to any other does not mean than His creating at a particular time 
is not perfectly rational. One can get the contrary conclusion only by em-
ploying a false principle of rationality. And so the temporalist can very rea-
sonably accept (a), i.e., the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Or at least Alston's 
argument has done nothing to show that she can't. 6 
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NOTES 
1. Thanks to Phil Quinn for bringing this possibility to my attention. 
2. It should be pointed out, in fairness to the accidental temporaJist, that while he does 
have to accept the possibility of an atemporal person, he needn't embrace the possibility 
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of a Boethian eternal person, that is, a person whose mode of existence is "the complete 
possession all at once of illimitable life" (see Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann's 
paper "Eternity" (Journal of Philosophy, Volume LXXVIII, Number 8 (August 1981) for 
an enlightening discussion of this account of eternity). 
3. This will require a change in the accidental temporalist's view. As I have defined the 
position, it requires that if there is time, God is temporal. 
4. Indeed, in the quotation on the first page of this paper, Alston says "If God is temporal 
we have to think of Him as infinitely extended in time." This strongly suggests that he 
has in mind the standard variety of temporalism. 
5. For example, cf. Augustine, Confessions, Book XI, Chapter 10. 
6. Thanks to Brian Leftow who got me thinking about Augustine's argument and to Phil 
Quinn for helpful suggestions. 
